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In this paper, I establish the grounds and rationale for a new ethical framework
with regards to the responsibility of entities in the developed world – people,
corporations, organizations, and governments – towards victims of humanitarian crises
such as inescapable poverty and disease in the third world. I will examine why the
prevention of global problems is not perceived as urgent and what may be needed to align
policies and actions with more ethically appropriate principles in a global context.
I begin by creating a thought experiment to make a point. Please imagine yourself
in the following two scenarios:
Scenario A: A train is speeding down a track with a child stuck to the train tracks
just 300 meters away. Two hundred meters from the train, the track splits and
goes a different way. You, a passerby, happen to be standing next to a switch. A
nearby sign clearly indicates that if and only if the switch is pulled will the tracks
change such that the train will go in the other direction, and the child will not be
killed. If you do not pull the switch, the train will be unable to stop and the child
will be killed immediately
Scenario B: The situation is the same as in scenario A, except that the train tracks
are already positioned to direct the train down the track that the child is not on.
Again you are by the switch. Pulling the switch in this case would direct the train
towards the child. If you do not pull the switch, the child will live. If you do pull
the switch the train will kill the child.
For both scenarios, let us make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: It matters to you that the child lives.
Assumption 2: You are capable of operating the switch.
Assumption 3: You trust that the switch will work as intended.
Assumption 4: You have complete knowledge of the consequences of your
decision to the child.
Now, consider the following question:
Is there a moral difference between a) not pulling the switch in Scenario A (letting
the train take its course, thus killing the child) and b) pulling the switch in
Scenario B (changing the train’s course, thus killing the child)?
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Consider your answer to that, whatever it may be. Now analyze the following
more generalized question:
Is there a moral difference between a) an informed inaction that takes a life and b)
a deliberate action that takes a life?
And finally, a very specific and contextually-modified version of the question:
Is there a moral difference between a) flying to a third-world country and
shooting to death a malnourished man and b) being able to donate funds which
would have provided food, water and medicine to save a man from starvationcaused death, but choosing, instead, not to donate these funds for personal
reasons?
Through this succession of questions, I wish to demonstrate the fallacy of the
existence of a moral difference between action and inaction. Few would doubt the
immorality of not pulling a switch to save a child’s life when it is so blindingly easy to do
so. Yet somehow, the silent death of a person so distant and removed from our reality,
barely seems to matter, barely lets Assumption 1 hold by analogy.
In the simple thought experiment, we see that the act of circumstantially having to
flip or not flip a switch is entirely trivial; the effect of the child’s death is singularly
relevant and should be the only matter of real concern. That is, there exists a moral
equivalence between action and inaction when the consequential effect is the same and
the cost difference between action and inaction is negligible. In less simple and obvious
scenarios, however, failure to prevent harm (inaction) is erroneously treated as different
from an action to cause harm. There seems nothing wrong with not donating one’s hardearned money to something or someone so unrelated and unconnected to our everyday
lives and reality. This fallacy, however, lies at the root of the ethical deficiencies that
persist in the present conditions of humanitarian efforts in our globalized world.
Specifically, this fallacy introduces severe limitations to individuals’ willingness to act
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when faced with a humanitarian decision, and to legal and ethical systems’ ability
prescribe actions which are for the world’s greater good.
The phenomenon of globalization has single-handedly elevated the relevance and
scope of this problem to epic proportions because the ability to aid in global poverty is
overwhelmingly possible and obvious. We can no longer plead ignorance to such
devastating crises that persist in the very world in which we reside. While we reap the
economic and cultural benefits of a unified world, we can not selectively choose to ignore
the immense hardships suffered by those living in impoverished, indebted, and unstable
regions of the world. The ability to prevent tragedy belongs to you, and me, and everyone
around us just as much as if we were the ones standing by the deterministic train switch.
Statistics help to demonstrate the problems. One in six in sub-Saharan Africa dies
before the age of 5. 1 11,000,000 lives are prematurely claimed due to preventable hunger
alone each 365 days. A child in the developing world consumes less than 1/30th of the
water a child in the developed world does 2 due to adverse climate and insufficient clean
water. Imagine that it were your children or siblings that had such a high probability of
mortality. Imagine not having sanitary water to offer a dehydrated infant crying in your
arms. The list of facts and statistics and realities goes on, and I believe everyone should
take an honest look at the numbers, conditions, and stories for themselves. But passively
observing statistics and expressing disapproval is ethically irrelevant without action.
As previously argued, failure to prevent harm is morally indistinguishable from
directly delivering harm when costs are negligible. Peter Singer, a professor at the Center
for Human Values at Princeton University, has a similar idea. In his essay, “Famine,

1
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Borgen Project, “Hunger and Poverty Facts”
“The UN Water Development Report: Facts and Figures”
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Affluence and Morality,” he insists, “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we
ought, morally, to do it.” Taking this seriously, aiding against humanitarian crises is not
just an ability, it is a responsibility. If we treat failure to prevent harm, suffering and
death as morally wrong, then this implies that the extent to which the developed world
does not act in making donations and providing sufficient aid to the developing world
constitutes an immense breach of moral standards not unlike genocide, mass murder, and
ethnic cleansing and persecution. I recognize that this claim is extreme, but it is not one
which deserves any tempering or qualification out of rational expedience.
To the affluent (note that I use the term “affluent” loosely considering that the
average per capita income of an American [$43,400] is 260 times, for instance, that of
Malawi 3 , and still 73 times that of Malawi when adjusting for costs of surviving),
sacrificing a portion of income or wealth is of absolutely no comparable moral
importance when juxtaposed with the abhorrent suffering and death that can be found in
many parts of the world. Consider that the spending in American restaurants 4 alone is
more than the GDP of the poorest 97 countries combined. 5 Consider that America’s lessthan-1% foreign aid spending is the lowest of any industrialized country in the world.
Consider that if everyone in America donated the cost of a single movie ticket per year,
we could double our current aid to both Africa and Asia.
Instead, in America, we have consumerism. American consumerism is founded on
diverting attention, on numbing the mind, on covertly fueling addiction. It has become far
too easy and far too common to dilute recognition of remediable world problems with
3
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entertainment, with pleasant social relationships, with blind pursuit of personal
satisfaction. Wasteful consumerism is one of the greatest marketing strategies out there
and it is this false premise of “I will be best off if I spend on myself and those that I
directly care for” that is gnawing at the ethics of inaction.
As a side note, I’d like to remark here that while I personally believe monetary
donations to be the most effective for individuals’ humanitarian efforts, due to the ability
of individuals and humanitarian organizations to specialize in income-generating and
efficient 6 humanitarian use of funds, respectively, this assumption is not critical. Those
individuals, organizations, or nations who believe themselves better able to contribute to
humanitarian ends through other means such as activism, social entrepreneurship,
marketing, and policy development should feel free to substitute these endeavors for
monetary donations.
Obviously no one feels nearly as guilty for not donating their hard-earned money
to people living in a distant country as they would for deliberately harming a person. In
large part, I believe the perceived moral difference between action and inaction can be
attributed to what social psychologists term the bystander effect. The bystander effect is
the phenomenon responsible for individuals’ inaction when faced with an emergency for
which they are neither directly responsible for nor solely capable of remedying. 7 In the
context of global poverty, the bystander effect manifests itself in many familiar ways. I
create the following list of causes and related examples which illustrate how and why
individuals act as passive bystanders to the emergencies of global famine and pestilence

6

The American Institute of Philanthropy (www.charitywatch.org), for example, provides an unbiased
assessment and rating of charities and philanthropic organizations of all kinds based on their efficient uses
of funds and actual impact for their cause
7
Wikipedia Contributors, “Bystander Effect”
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without moral qualms. The following list is not meant to be humorous or facetious; it
represents what I believe are actual factors in developed world’s unwillingness to treat
inaction as ethically relevant in a global context:
•

Self-concerns (“I have my own family to feed! And bills to pay!”)

•

Diffusion of responsibility (“If it’s so urgent, someone else is surely doing
something about it, right?”)

•

Distraction (“I should donate. Well, not now, the Yankees game is on.”)

•

Pluralistic ignorance (“No one else seems particularly worried about world
hunger. It must not be that big of a problem.”)

•

Perceived relationship between culture and problem (“If the people weren’t so
lazy and their political system weren’t so corrupt, they would be able to provide
for themselves.”)

•

Perceived lack of effectiveness (“Humanitarian organizations squander most
funds on administrative costs.”)

•

Costs exceed rewards (“Personally, I would gain more from taking my family to
Disneyland.”)

•

Perception of a lost cause (“Poverty has always existed and will always exist.
There’s no hope.”)
As can be seen, we as Americans are distracted, self-concerned, and skeptical. In

fact, donating is easy, rewarding, and extremely effective in preventing death and
alleviating suffering of people in very critical states of health. While writing this essay, I
donated $45 to Africare (www.africare.org), a newfound personal favorite organization.
It took me 6 minutes to learn about the organization’s initiatives, sign up, and donate. It

“ O n Inaction ” by Nikhil A. Nirmel

will take you less. Chances are, though, if you follow suit, no one will know. You may
receive no recognition or honor; you may find no observable difference in the state of the
world. Yet there is someone that is deeply thankful, as you would be if in their situation,
and there is truly is some inner gratification in helping someone you will never see or
know. While by no means a justification in and of itself, the gratification of selflessly and
silently donating is a feeling that offers a new check on materialistic desires, and on one’s
inextricable connection to the rest of the world. Try it.
The interesting thing is, though, that I do not feel that the developed world does
not care about famine, disease, infant mortality and the like. When it comes to giving a
few bucks to a homeless person or volunteering at a soup kitchen, it isn’t such a big deal.
When we try to care about much more pressing, immense, and distant world problems,
though, we feel helpless. We feel overwhelmed and incapable of making a difference. So
we blame those with more power, resources, clout, or contact with the third world.
Hence, major ethical controversies stem from the actions of corporations in the
developing world. The premise of the controversy usually goes something like this:
Company X makes so much profit that they can more than afford to pay workers better,
provide better living conditions, implement greater safety measures and so on. While
corporations should under no circumstance treat workers inhumanely, pressuring
companies to engage in profit-reducing acts of benevolence is illogical (hypocritical?) if
the people touting such claims are not themselves willing to sacrifice their own wealth or
income to prevent atrocities. All entities – be it an individual, a company, and
organization or a country – bear responsibility for the harmful effects of poverty that
persist due to their unwillingness to act or donate; all must sacrifice something that is
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legally – but perhaps not ethically – theirs to make a difference. It is arbitrary to deflect a
shared humanitarian responsibility to other entities simply because they have contact with
or clout in the developing world.
Further, there exists a problem in the way is the way funds used for corporate
responsibility initiatives are allocated, assessed, and regulated. Tort law in America is
designed to ensure that corporate safety expenditures equal or exceed the expected
reduction in harm that stakeholders would be willing to pay for. For example, if spending
$2 million would prevent $2.1 million in expected losses to stakeholders, the tort system
will penalize the corporation for investing any less than $2 million. Such mandates ignore
the opportunity cost of such corporate social responsibility. In financial management, no
investment decision is made without first considering the opportunity cost of capital –
that is, a comparison of investment opportunities with comparable risk. I propose that
opportunity costs be considered in ethical decisions too – not in the sense of financial
cost of capital, but instead, in the sense of the social benefit the money could alternatively
have if used to aid those that stand the most to gain from monetary resources. For
example, if spending $1 million dollars in safety precautions is expected to save the lives
of two American consumers, but those same funds could save 500 lives of nonstakeholders, perhaps non-citizens of the country, the latter should invariably be chosen.
Unfortunately, even the most proactive branches of business ethics typically limit
prescriptions of ethical actions to welfare of direct stakeholders. Almost by definition,
systems of corporate social responsibility commonly favor stakeholder interests over
corporate profits. The problem is that these frameworks prescribe profit-reducing actions
in cases where the benefits received by parties on the receiving end of profit-reduction
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are far smaller than benefits that could be offered with extra profit to individuals, such as
those on the brink of starvation, who are far more sensitive to monetary donations. While
economic efficiency is one of the most researched, debated, and valued aspects of
globalization, it seems illogical that ethical efficiency is not, too, taken into account when
making decisions that have the potential for global reach. It may well be more ethically
efficient to capture more profits at the expense of direct stakeholders if the additional
profits may be distributed to prevent extreme and pressing tragedies from occurring well
outside an entity’s realm of operation. While this idea is not practically flawless to
implement, the point is that just because it is more legally and socially defensible to limit
the scope of ethical responsibility to those to whom we have a direct relationship, it does
not mean that it is ethically optimal to accord consideration only to those that who come
in direct contact with our actions.
The concept of responsibility to stakeholders represents a deeper fallacy with
which we have all grown up, where there seems to exist dichotomies in the way we value
lives. We learn early on that it is natural to place forms of life into a hierarchy, to
mentally compartmentalize the beings that have value and those that don’t. Stepping on a
spider is fine; strangling a cat is not. We are good at rationalizing. The spider doesn’t feel
pain. The spider can’t think. The spider is ugly. The spider is worthless. The spider this,
the spider that: the spider just died. Somewhere along the line, humans, too, got tossed
into this absurd ranking of values based on absurd lines of reasoning. Well over $200
billion was spent re-building New Orleans after Katrina, yet under $28 billion was
donated by America to foreign development assistance in 2005. Clearly we value the
well-being of an American immensely greater than we value the life of someone abroad
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that has a disease unfamiliar to us. More generally, we value lives in direct proportion to
the extent to we can relate to them. We all have our biases, and we all see life on a
relative value scale. We will readily spend hundreds of thousands of dollars locating a
lost backpacker in Colorado, but ignore the fact that it would cost under a dollar a day to
sustain the life of the world’s most destitute people and this trifling amount of money is
not being spent. “They” are not contributing. “They” are immoral. “They” are unlucky.
“They” are not innovative. “They” owe debt. “They” will never be self-sustaining.
“They” impose a cost on society “They” are greedy. “They” are used to it. “They” are a
lost cause. One of Them just died, and we can not continue heeding the ethically
deceptive hierarchy which we continue to construct in determining what – and who –
matters.
Remedying apathy and eliminating biases are no small tasks by any standards.
The emotional appeal has been attempted time and again with limited success through
advertisements depicting frail, malnourished children. In my opinion, society needs very
extreme and necessarily controversial jolts into ethical reality. Perhaps we could
mandate labels, adjacent to health and nutritional warnings that read, “The cost of this
pack of cigarettes could sustain 5 people on the verge of death. Please donate instead.”
We should make this tradeoff obvious for all products, for all court decisions, for all
military spending, and so on. An even more extreme example, the government could
bring a starving child from India to America, and enclose him in a transparent case in
Times Square, requiring that $5 million be donated by the public in order to save the
child, otherwise, the child will be permitted to die unaided in public visibility. This would
tangibly (although perversely and controversially) blur the difference between murder
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and permission of death for onlookers and bystanders. Murder is an inherently
emotionally-charged issue. Permitting death is not. Yet it is as much of an ethical breach
not to prevent suffering and death through monetary donations and humanitarian activism
as it is to murder someone unprovoked.
Only once murder and permission of death are thoroughly equated in the minds of
society, and only once we begin to rid our minds of a value-scaled hierarchy of life of
which we find ourselves at the top, will we willingly reach out to support those who are
in the most crucial need. The switches of benevolence are well within our grasps and
every one of us has the economic strength and humanitarian voice needed to pull the
switch that yes, may deprive us of one extra pair of shoes, of one extra political vote, of
one extra happy shareholder, but that will be the deciding factor in one extra infant’s life,
in one extra disease’s contagion. Globally-encompassing systems of ethics are a
necessary consequence of globalization as we know it, and today, inaction stands as the
greatest obstacle in attaining such ethical ideals. I envision, anticipate, and desperately
hope for a future in which the recognition that inaction has real effects to real people will
be widespread, in which social pressure to eliminate preventable suffering and death will
be overwhelming. Only when each of us recognizes our ethical role in the global
community – in a world that happens staring at a switch stuck in “Scenario A” by default
– can we truly claim to have recognized and unleashed the benefits of global
humanitarianism. It is in our power, and well within the scope of our ethical duty, to
eliminate our biases, to give lives equal moral weight, and to see our ability as an
unequivocal responsibility. It is up to each one of us to make the critical decision – on
which our fellow humans’ lives precariously hinge – to act, ignore, or defer.
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